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Abstract—In this paper, we first address adverse effects of
cyber-physical attacks on distributed synchronization of multi-
agent systems, by providing conditions under which an attacker
can destabilize the underlying network, as well as another set
of conditions under which local neighborhood tracking errors
of intact agents converge to zero. Based on this analysis, we
propose a Kullback-Liebler divergence based criterion in view
of which each agent detects its neighbors’ misbehavior and,
consequently, forms a self-belief about the trustworthiness of the
information it receives. Agents continuously update their self-
beliefs and communicate them with their neighbors to inform
them of the significance of their outgoing information. Moreover,
if the self-belief of an agent is low, it forms trust on its neighbors.
Agents incorporate their neighbors’ self-beliefs and their own
trust values on their control protocols to slow down and mitigate
attacks. We show that using the proposed resilient approach, an
agent discards the information it receives from a neighbor only
if its neighbor is compromised, and not solely based on the dis-
crepancy among neighbors’ information, which might be caused
by legitimate changes, and not attacks. The proposed approach
is guaranteed to work under mild connectivity assumptions.
Index Terms—Distributed control, Resilient Control, Attack
Analysis, Multi-agent systems.
I. Introduction
A Distributed Multi-Agent System (DMAS) is collection of
dynamical systems or agents that interact with each other over
a communication network to achieve coordinated operations
and behaviors [1]–[4]. In the case of synchronization of
DMASs, the objective is to guarantee that all agents reach
agreement on a common value or trajectory of interest. Despite
their numerous applications in a variety of disciplines, DMASs
are vulnerable to attacks, which is one of the main bottleneck
that arise in their wide deployment. In contrast to other
undesirable inputs, such as disturbances and noises, cyber-
physical attacks are intentionally planned to maximize the
damage to the overall system or even destabilize it.
There has been extensive research progress in developing
attack detection/identification and mitigation approaches for
both spatially distributed systems [5]–[14] and DMASs [15]–
[30]. Despite tremendous and welcoming progress, most of
the mentioned mitigation approaches for DMASs use the
discrepancy among agents and their neighbors to detect and
mitigate the effect of an attack. However, as shown in this
paper, a stealthy attack can make all agents become un-
stable simultaneously, and thus misguide existing mitigation
approaches. Moreover, this discrepancy could be caused by a
legitimate change in the state of an agent, and rejecting this
useful information can decrease the speed of convergence to
the desired consensus and harm connectivity of the network.
In this paper, we present attack analysis, detection, and
mitigation mechanisms for DMASs with linear structures.
We show that local neighborhood tracking errors of intact
agents converge to zero, regardless of the attack, if the set of
eigenvalues of the attacker signal generator dynamics matrix
is a subset of the set of eigenvalues of the system dynamics
matrix. We call these types of attacks internal model principle
(IMP)-based attacks. In spite of convergence to zero of local
neighborhood tracking errors, the overall network could be
destabilized, and we provide sufficient conditions for this
to happen. We then develop attack detectors that identify
both IMP-based and non-IMP-based attacks. To detect IMP-
based attacks, two local error sequences with folded Gaussian
distributions are introduced based on the relative information
of the agents. We show that they diverge under an IMP-
based attack. A Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence criterion
is then introduced to measure the divergence between these
two univariate folded Gaussian distributions, and consequently
capture IMP-based attacks. Similarly, since non-IMP based
attacks change the statistical properties of the local neighbor-
hood tracking error, to detect non-IMP-based attacks, the KL
divergence is employed to measure the discrepancy between
the Gaussian distributions of the actual and nominal expected
local neighborhood tracking errors. Then, a self-belief value,
as a metric capturing the probability of the presence of attacks
directly on sensors or actuators of the agent itself or on its
neighbors, is presented for each agent by combining these
two KL-based detectors. The self-belief indicates the level of
trustworthiness of the agent’s own outgoing information, and
is transmitted to its neighbors. Furthermore, when the self-
belief of an agent is low, the trustworthiness of its incoming
information from its neighbors is estimated using a particular
notion of trust. Trust for each individual neighbor is developed
based on the relative entropy between the neighbor’s informa-
tion and agent’s own information. Finally, by incorporating
neighbor’s self-belief and trust values, we propose modified
weighted control protocols to ensure mitigation of both types
of attacks. Simulation results included in the paper validate
the effectiveness of the approach.
II. Preliminaries
A directed graph (digraph) G consists of a pair (V, E) in
which V = {v1, · · · , vN} is a set of nodes and E ⊆ V×V is a
set of edges. We denote the directed link (edge) from v j to vi
by the ordered pair (v j, vi). The adjacency matrix is defined as
A = [ai j], with ai j > 0 if (v j, vi) ∈ E, and ai j = 0 otherwise.
We assume there are no repeated edges and no self loops, i.e.,
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2aii = 0 ∀i ∈ N with N = {1, . . . ,N} . The nodes in the set
Ni = {v j : (v j, vi) ∈ E} are said to be neighbors of node νi.
The in-degree of vi is the number of edges having vi as a head.
The out-degree of a node vi is the number of edges having vi
as a tail. If the in-degree equals the out-degree for all nodes
vi ∈ V the graph is said to be balanced. The graph Laplacian
matrix is defined as L = D − A, where D = diag(di) is the
in-degree matrix, with di =
∑
j∈Ni
ai j as the weighted in-degree
of node νi. A node is called as a root node if it can reach all
other nodes of the digraph G through a directed path. A leader
is a root node with no incoming link. A (directed) tree is a
connected digraph where every node except one, called the
root, has in-degree equal to one. A spanning tree of a digraph
is a directed tree formed by graph edges, which connects all
the nodes of the graph.
Throughout the paper, we denote the set of integers by
Z. The set of integers greater than or equal to some integer
q ∈ Z is denoted Z>q. The cardinality of a set S is denoted
by |S |. λ(A) and tr(A) denote, respectively, the eigenvalues
and trace of the matrix A. Furthermore, λmin(A) represents
minimum eigenvalue of matrix A. The Kronecker product of
matrices A and B is denoted by A ⊗ B, and diag (A1, . . . , An)
represents a block diagonal matrix with matrices Ai, ∀ i ∈ N
as its diagonal entries. 1N is the N-vector of ones and IN
is the N × N identity matrix. Im(R) and ker(R) represent,
respectively, the range space and the null space of R, and
span(a1, . . . , an) is the set of all linear combinations of the
vectors a1, . . . , an. A Gaussian distribution with mean µ and
covariance Σ is denoted by N (µ,Σ). Moreover, FN
(
µ¯, σ¯2
)
represents univariate folded Gaussian distribution with µ¯ and
σ¯2 as mean and variance, respectively [?]. E[.] denotes the
expectation operator.
Assumption 1. The communication graph G is directed and
has a spanning tree.
Definition 1 [31]- [32]. A square matrix A ∈ Rn×n is called
a singular M-matrix, if all its off-diagonal elements are non-
positive and all its eigenvalues have non-negative real parts. 
Definition 2 [31]- [32]. A square matrix A ∈ Rn×n is called
a non-singular M-matrix, if all its off-diagonal elements are
non-positive and all its eigenvalues have positive real parts. 
Lemma 1 [31]- [32]. The graph Laplacian matrix L of a
directed graph G has at least one zero eigenvalue, and all its
nonzero eigenvalues have positive real parts. Zero is a simple
eigenvalue of L, if and only if Assumption 1 is satisfied.
III. Overview of Consensus in DMASs
In this section, we provide an overview of the consensus
problem for leaderless DMAS. Consider a group of N homo-
geneous agents with linear identical dynamics described by
x˙i(t) = Axi(t) + Bui(t) ∀ i ∈ N (1)
where xi ∈ Rn and ui ∈ Rm denote, respectively, the state
and the control input of agent i. The matrices A ∈ Rn×n and
B ∈ Rn×m are, respectively, the drift dynamics and the input
matrix.
Problem 1. Design local control protocols ui for all agents
∀i ∈ N in (1) such that all agents reach consensus or synchro-
nization (agreement) on some common value or trajectory of
interest, i.e.,
lim
t→∞ ||x j(t) − xi(t)|| = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N (2)
Assumption 2. The system dynamics matrix A in (1) is
assumed to be marginally stable.
Remark 1. Based on Assumption 2, all the eigenvalues of A
have non-positive real part. This is a standard assumption in
the literature for consensus or synchronization problems [33].
Note that if A is Hurwitz, the synchronization problem has a
trivial solution and can be solved by making the dynamics of
each agent stable independently. Moreover, stable eigenvalues
of A, if there are any, can be ignored by reducing the dimension
of A, because they only contribute to the transient response of
the consensus trajectories [33].
Consider the distributed control protocol for each agent i as
[31]- [32]
ui = cKηi ∀ i ∈ N (3)
where
ηi =
N∑
j=1
ai j(x j − xi) (4)
represents the local neighborhood tracking error for the agent i
with ai j as the (i, j)-th entry of the graph adjacency matrix A.
Moreover, c and K ∈ Rm×n denote, respectively, scalar coupling
gain and feedback control gain matrix. The control design (3)-
(4) is distributed in the sense that each agent seeks to make the
difference between its state and those of its neighbors equal
to zero using only relative state information of its neighbors
provided by (4).
Several approaches are presented to design c and K locally
to solve Problem 1 [31]- [34]. To this end, the gains K
and c are designed such that A − cλiBK is Hurwitz for all
i = 2, . . . ,N [31]- [34]. Specifically, it is shown in [31], [34]
that under Assumption 1, if K is designed locally for each
agent by solving an algebraic Riccati equation and c > 12λmin(L) ,
then A − cλiBK is Hurwitz and Problem 1 is solved. In the
subsequent sections, we assume that c and K are designed
appropriately so that in the absence of attacks Problem 1 is
solved. We then analyze the effect of attacks and propose
mitigation approaches.
Remark 2. Note that the presented results subsume the leader-
follower synchronization problem and the average consensus
as special cases. For the leader-follower case, the leader is
only root node in the graph and thus the desired trajectory is
dictated by the leader, whereas for the average consensus case,
the graph is assumed to be balanced and A = 0 and B = Im.
IV. Attack Modelling and Analysis for DMASs
In this section, attacks on agents are modelled and a
complete attack analysis is provided.
3A. Attack Modelling
In this subsection, attacks on DMASs are modelled. Attacks
on actuators of agent i can be modelled as
uci = ui + βiu
d
i (5)
where ui, udi and u
c
i denote, respectively, the nominal value
of the control protocol for agent i in (1), the disrupted signal
directly injected into actuators of agent i, and the corrupted
control protocol of agent i. If agent i is under actuator attack,
then βi = 1, otherwise βi = 0. Similarly, one can model attacks
on sensors of agent i as
xci = xi + αix
d
i (6)
where xi, xdi and x
c
i denote, respectively, the nominal value of
the state of agent i in (4), the disrupted signal directly injected
into sensors of agent i, and the corrupted state of agent i. If
agent i is under sensor attack, then αi = 1, otherwise αi = 0.
Using the corrupted state (6) in the controller (3)-(4) with the
corrupted control input (5) in (1), the system dynamics under
attack becomes
x˙i = Axi + Bui + B fi (7)
where fi denotes the overall attack affecting the agent i which
can be written as
fi = βiudi + cK
∑
j∈Ni
ai j
(
α jxdj − αixdi
)
(8)
with xdj as the disruption in the received state of the j
th
neighbor due to injected attack signal either into sensors or
actuators of agent j or into the incoming communication link
from agent j to agent i.
The following definition categorizes all attacks into two
categories. The first type of attack exploits the knowledge of
the system dynamics A and use it in the design of its attack
signal. That is, for the first type of attack for fi in (8), one has
f˙i = Ψ fi (9)
where Ψ ∈ Rm×m depends on the knowledge of the system
dynamics A as discussed in Definition 3. On the other hand,
for the second type of attack, the attacker has no knowledge
of the system dynamics A and this can cover all other attacks
that are not in the form of (9).
Define {
EΨ = {λ1(Ψ), . . . , λm(Ψ)}
EA = {λ1(A), . . . , λn(A)} (10)
where λi(Ψ) ∀i = 1, . . . ,m and λi(A) ∀i = 1, . . . ,N are, re-
spectively, the set of eigenvalues of the attack signal generator
dynamics matrix Ψ and the system dynamics matrix A. Define
a set of eigenvalues of the system dynamics matrix A which lie
on imaginary axis as EmA = {λ1(A), . . . , λl(A)} where EmA ⊆ EA.
Definition 3 (IMP-based and non-IMP-based Attacks).
If the attack signal fi in (7) is generated by (9), then the
attack signal is called the internal model principle (IMP)-based
attack, if EΨ ⊆ EA. Otherwise, i.e., EΨ 1 EA or if the attacker
has no dynamics (e.g. a random signal), it is called a non-IMP
based attack. 
Remark 3. Note that we do not limit attacks to the IMP-based
attacks given by (9). Attacks are placed into two classes in
Definition 3 based on their impact on the system performance,
as to be shown in the subsequent sections. The non-IMP based
attacks cover a broad range of attacks.
Definition 4 (Compromised and Intact Agent). We call an
agent that is directly under attack as a compromised agent.
An agent is called intact if it is not compromised. We denote
the set of intact agents as NInt, i.e.,NInt = N\NComp where
NComp denotes the set of compromised agents.

Using (3)-(4), the global form of control input, i.e., u =
[uT1 , . . . , u
T
N]
T can be written as
u = (−cL ⊗ K)x (11)
where L denotes the graph Laplacian matrix.
By using (11) in (7), the global dynamics of agents under
attack becomes
x˙(t) = (IN ⊗ A) x(t) + (IN ⊗ B) uc(t) (12)
where
uc(t) = u(t) + f (t) ∆= (−cL ⊗ K)x(t) + f (t) (13)
with f (t) = [ f T1 (t), . . . , f
T
N (t)]
T and x(t) = [xT1 (t), . . . , x
T
N(t)]
T
denote, respectively, the overall vector of attacks on agents
and the global vector of the states of agents.
If agents are not under attack, i.e., f (t) = 0, then, the control
input (11) eventually compensates for the difference between
the agents’ initial conditions and becomes zero once they reach
an agreement. That is, in the absence of attack, uc(t) = u(t)
goes to zero (i.e., uc(t) → 0), and, on consensus, the global
dynamics of agents become
x˙ss(t) = (IN ⊗ A) xss(t) (14)
where xss = lim
t→∞x(t) is called the global steady state of agents.
Throughout the paper, regardless of whether agents are under
attack or not, we say that agents reach a steady state and their
steady state is generated by (14) if uc(t) → 0. Otherwise, if
uc(t) 6→ 0, we say agents never reach a steady state, and thus
(14) does not hold true.
Remark 4. In the presence of attack, whether agents reach
a steady state or not, i.e., whether uc(t) → 0 or uc(t) 6→ 0,
plays an important role in the attack analysis and mitigation
to follow. Reaching a steady state is necessary for agents to
achieve consensus. However, we show that even if agents reach
a steady state, they will not achieve consensus if the system is
under attack. More specifically, we show that under a non-
IMP based attack, agents do not reach a steady state and
their local neighborhood tracking errors also do not converge
to zero. For an IMP-based attack, the attacker can either 1)
make all agents reach a steady state, but agents are still far
from synchronization or consensus, or 2) destabilize the entire
network by assuring that agents do not reach a steady state.
4B. Attack Analysis
In this subsection, a graph theoretic-based approach is
utilized to analyze the effect of attacks on DMASs. To this
end, the following notation and lemmas are used.
Let the graph Laplacian matrix L be partitioned as
L =
[ Lr×r 0r×nr
Lnr×r Lnr×nr
]
(15)
where r and nr in (15) denote, respectively, the number of
root nodes and non-root nodes. Moreover, Lr×r and Lnr×nr
are, respectively, the sub-graph matrices corresponding to the
sub-graphs of root nodes and non-root nodes.
Lemma 2. Consider the partitioned graph Laplacian matrix
(15). Then, Lr×r is a singular M-matrix and Lnr×nr is a non-
singular M-matrix.
Proof. We first prove that the subgraph of root nodes is
strongly connected. According to the definition of a root node,
there always exists a directed path from a root node to all other
nodes of the graph G, including other root nodes. Therefore, in
the graph G, there always exists a path from each root node
to all other root nodes. We now show that removing non-
root nodes from the graph G does not affect the connectivity
of the subgraph comprised of only root nodes. In the graph
G, if a non-root node is not an incoming neighbor of a root
node, then its removal does not harm the connectivity of the
subgraph of the root nodes. Suppose that removing a non-root
node affects the connectivity of the subgraph of root nodes.
This requires the non-root node to be an incoming neighbor
of a root node. However, this makes the removed node a root
node, as it can now access all other nodes through the root
node it is connected to. Hence, this argument shows that the
subgraph of root nodes is always strongly connected. Then,
based on Lemma 1, Lr×r has zero as one of its eigenvalues,
which implies that Lr×r is a singular M-matrix according to
Definition 1. On the other hand, from (15), since L is a lower
triangular matrix, the eigenvalues of L are the union of the
eigenvalues of Lr×r and Lnr×nr. Moreover, as stated in Lemma
1, L has a simple zero eigenvalue and, as shown above, zero
is the eigenvalue of Lr×r. Therefore, all eigenvalues of Lnr×nr
have positive real parts only, and thus based on Definition 2,
Lnr×nr is a non-singular M-matrix. 
In the following Lemmas 3-4 and Theorem 1, we now
provide the conditions under which the agents can reach a
steady state.
Lemma 3. Consider the global dynamics of DMAS (12) under
attack. Let the attack signal f (t) be a non-IMP based attack.
Then, agents never reach a steady state, i.e., uc(t) 6→ 0.
Proof. We prove this result by contradiction. Assume that the
attack signal f (t) is a non-IMP based attack, i.e., EΨ 1 EA,
but uc(t) → 0 in (12), which implies x˙i → Axi for all i ∈ N .
Using the modal decomposition, one has
xi(t)→
n∑
j=1
(r jxi(0))eλ j(A)tm j (16)
where r j and m j denote, respectively, the left and right
eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue λ j(A). On the other
hand, based on (13) uc(t)→ 0 implies f (t)→ (cL⊗ K)x(t) or
equivalently
fi(t)→
∑
j∈Ni
ai j(x j(t) − xi(t)) (17)
for all i ∈ N . As shown in (16), the right-hand side of (17)
is generated by the natural modes of the system dynamics
whereas the left-hand side is generated by the natural modes
of the attack signal generator dynamics in (9). By the prior
assumption, EΨ 1 EA, the attacker’s natural modes are differ-
ent from those of the system dynamics. Therefore, (17) cannot
be satisfied which contradicts the assumption. This completes
the proof. 
Equation (17) in Lemma 3 also shows that for non-IMP
based attacks, the local neighborhood tracking error is nonzero
for a compromised agent. The following results show that
under IMP-based attack, either agents’ state diverge, or they
reach a steady state while their local neighborhood tracking
errors converge to zero, despite attack. The following lemma
is needed in Theorem 1, which gives conditions under which
agents reach a steady state under IMP-based attack. Then,
Theorem 2 shows that under what conditions an IMP-based
attack makes the entire network of agents unstable.
Define {
S A(t) = [eλA1 t, . . . , eλAn t]
S ψ(t) = [eλΨ1 t, . . . , eλΨn t]
(18)
where eλAi t ∀i = 1, . . . , n and eλΨi t ∀i = 1, . . . ,m are, respec-
tively, the set of natural modes of agent dynamics A in (1) and
the attacker dynamics Ψ in (9).
Lemma 4. Consider the global dynamics of DMAS (12) under
attack on non-root nodes. Then, for an IMP-based attack,
agents reach a steady state, i.e., uc(t)→ 0.
Proof. According to (14), in steady state, one has x˙ss(t) →
(IN ⊗ A) xss(t) since uc(t) → 0. This implies that xss(t) ∈
span(S A) where S A is defined in (18). On the other hand, if
agents reach a steady state, then based on (13), one has
(cL ⊗ K)xss(t) = f (t) (19)
Define the global steady state vector xss(t) = [x¯Trs, x¯
T
nrs]
T ,
where x¯rs and x¯nrs are, respectively, the global steady states
of root nodes and non-root nodes. Since attack is only on
non-root nodes, f (t) can be written as f (t) = [0r, f¯ Tnr]
T , where
f¯nr = [ f Tr+1, . . . , f
T
N ]
T represents the attack vector on non-root
nodes.
Then, using (15) and (19), one has{
(cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs = 0
(cLnr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs + (cLnr×nr ⊗ K)x¯nrs = f¯nr (20)
As stated in Lemma 2, Lr×r is a singular M-matrix with zero
as an eigenvalue and 1r is its corresponding right eigenvector
and, thus, the solution to the first equation of (20) becomes
x¯rs = c11r for some positive scalar c1. Using x¯rs = c11r in the
second equation of (20), the global steady states of non-root
nodes becomes
x¯nrs = (cLnr×nr ⊗ K)−1
[
−(cLnr×r ⊗ K)c11r + f¯nr
]
(21)
5Equation (21) shows that the steady states of non-root nodes
are affected by the attack signal f (t). If EΨ 1 EA, it results
in x¯nrs ∈ span(S A, S Ψ) where S A and S Ψ are defined in (18)
which contradicts xss(t) ∈ span(S A). Therefore, condition EΨ ⊂
EA is necessary to conclude that for any f = [0r, f¯ Tnr]
T , there
exists a steady state solution xss(t), i.e., uc(t)→ 0 holds true.
This completes the proof. 
The following theorem provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for IMP-based attacks to assure uc(t)→ 0.
Theorem 1. Consider the global dynamics of DMAS (12)
with the control protocol (13), where the attack signal f (t) is
generated based on an IMP-based attack. Then, agents reach
a steady state, i.e., uc(t)→ 0 if and only if the attack signals
satisfy
N∑
k=1
pk fk = 0 (22)
where pk are the nonzero elements of the left eigenvector of the
graph Laplacian matrix L associated with its zero eigenvalue.
Proof. It was shown in the Lemma 4 that for the IMP-
based attack on non-root nodes, agents reach a steady state,
i.e., uc(t) → 0. Therefore, whether agents reach a steady
state or not depends solely upon attacks on root nodes. Let
f (t) = [ f¯r, f¯nr] where f¯r represents the vector of attacks for
root nodes given by f¯r = [ f T1 , . . . , f
T
r ]
T . Now, we first prove
the necessary condition for root nodes. If uc(t) → 0, then,
using (15) and (19) , there exists a nonzero vector x¯rs for root
nodes such that
(cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs = f¯r (23)
where x¯rs can be considered as the global steady state of the
root nodes. Moreover, based on Lemma 3, (23) does not hold,
if EΨ 1 EA which implies that (23) is true only for EΨ ⊆ EA.
As stated in Lemma 2, Lr×r is a strongly connected graph
of root nodes and, therefore, it is a singular M-matrix. Let
w¯T = [p1, . . . , pr] be the left eigenvector associated with the
zero eigenvalue of Lr×r. Now, pre-multiplying both sides of
(23) by w¯T and using the fact that w¯TLr×r = 0 yield
w¯T (cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs = w¯T f¯r = 0 (24)
This states that IMP-based attacks on root nodes have to
satisfy
N∑
k=1
pk fk = 0 to ensure agents reach a steady state, i.e.,
uc(t) → 0. Note that pk = 0 for k = r + 1, . . . ,N, i.e., the
elements of the left eigenvector of the graph Laplacian matrix
L, corresponding to its zero eigenvalue, are zero for non-root
nodes [31]- [32]. This proves the necessity part.
Now, we prove the sufficient part by contradiction for root
nodes. Assume agents reach a steady state, i.e., uc(t)→ 0, but
N∑
k=1
pk fk , 0. Note that, agents reach a steady state implies that
there exists a nonzero vector x¯rs such that (23) holds. Using
(24) and
N∑
k=1
pk fk , 0, one can conclude that w¯T (cLr×r⊗K)x¯rs ,
0. This can happen only when Lr×r does not have any zero
eigenvalue, which violates the fact in Lemma 2 that Lr×r is
a strongly connected graph. Therefore, w¯T (cLr×r ⊗ K)x¯rs = 0
which results in
N∑
k=1
pk fk = 0 and contradicts the assumption
made. This completes the proof. 
Theorem 2. Consider the global dynamics of DMAS (12) with
the control protocol (13) under IMP-based attack. If (22) is
not satisfied and EΨ ∩ EmA , ∅, then the dynamics of agents
become unstable.
Proof. Since it is assumed that the condition in (22) is not
satisfied, then based on Theorem 1, uc(t) 6→ 0 even under
IMP-based attack. Thus, the attack signal f (t) does not vanish
over time and eventually acts as an input to the system in
(12). Assume that there exists at least one common marginal
eigenvalue between the system dynamics matrix A in (1) and
the attacker dynamics matrix Ψ in (9), i.e., EΨ∩EmA , ∅. Then,
the multiplicity of at least one marginally stable pole becomes
greater than 1. Therefore, the attacker destabilizes the state of
the agent in (12). Moreover, since (22) is not satisfied, then
the attack is on root nodes, and root nodes have a path to all
other nodes in the network, the state of the all agents become
unstable. This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3 below now shows that despite IMP-based at-
tacks, if uc(t) → 0, the local neighborhood tracking error (4)
converges to zero for intact agents that have a path to the
compromised agent, while they do not synchronize.
Theorem 3. Consider the global dynamics of DMAS (12)
under attack f (t). Then, the local neighborhood tracking error
(4) converges to zero for all intact agents if uc(t)→ 0. More-
over, intact agents that are reachable from the compromised
agents do not converge to the desired consensus trajectory.
Proof. In the presence of attacks, the global dynamics of the
DMAS (12) with (13) can be written as
x˙(t) = (IN ⊗ A) x(t) + (IN ⊗ B)((−cL ⊗ K)x(t) + f (t)) (25)
where x(t) =
[
xT1 (t), . . . , x
T
N(t)
]T
is the global vector of the state
of agents and f (t) =
[
f T1 (t), . . . , f
T
N (t)
]T
denotes the global
vector of attacks. As shown in (14) that if uc(t) → 0, agents
reach a steady state. That is,
cKηi → − fi ∀ i ∈ N (26)
where ηi denotes the local neighborhood tracking error of
agent i defined in (4). For the intact agent, by definition one
has fi = 0, and thus (26) implies that the local neighborhood
tracking error (4) converges to zero. Now, we show that intact
agents which are reachable from the compromised agent do
not synchronize to the desired consensus behavior. To do this,
let agent j be under attack. Assuming that all intact agents
synchronize, one has xk = xi ∀i, k ∈ N−{ j}. Now, consider the
intact agent i as an immediate neighbor of the compromised
agent j. Then using (13), if uc(t) → 0, for intact agent i, i.e.,
fi = 0, one has ∑
k∈Ni−{ j}
ai j(xk − xi) + (x j − xi)→ 0 (27)
where xk denotes the state of the all intact neighbors of
agent i. On the other hand, (7) shows that the state of the
6compromised agent j, i.e., x j, is deviated from the desired
consensus value with a value proportional to f j. Therefore,
(27) results in deviating the state of the immediate neighbor of
the compromised agent j from the desired consensus behavior,
which contradicts the assumption. Consequently, intact agents
that have a path to the compromised agent do not reach
consensus, while their local neighborhood tracking error is
zero. This completes the proof. 
Remark 5. The effects of an attacker on a network of agents
depend upon the dynamics of the attack signal. As stated in
Theorem 2, to destabilize the entire network, the attack signal
requires access to at least one common marginal eigenvalue
with the system dynamics. To this end, an attacker can exploit
the security of the network by eavesdropping and monitoring
the transmitted data to identify at least one of the marginal
eigenvalues of the agent dynamics, and then launch a signal
with the same frequency to a root node to make the agents
state go to infinity.
Remark 6. Although, for the sake of simplicity, we consider
DMASs with identical dynamics, the presented result can be
extended to heterogeneous MASs. This is briefly discussed
in the following formulation. The dynamics for a linear
heterogeneous MASs is given by{
x˙i(t) = Aixi(t) + Biui(t)
yi(t) = Cixi(t)
∀ i ∈ N (28)
where xi ∈ Rni , ui ∈ Rmi and yi ∈ Rp denote, respectively, the
state, the control input and the output of agent i. The matrices
Ai ∈ Rni×ni , Bi ∈ Rni×mi and Ci ∈ Rp×ni are, respectively, the
drift dynamics, the input matrix and the output matrix.
For heterogeneous MASs, the consensus trajectory is usu-
ally generated by a virtual exosystem dynamics given by [35]-
[36] {
x˙c(t) = S xc(t)
yc(t) = Rxc(t)
(29)
where xc ∈ Rq and yc ∈ Rp are, respectively, the state and
output of the desired consensus trajectory. For heterogeneous
MASs the distributed control protocol ui in (28) is designed
such that all agents synchronize to the output of virtual exosys-
tem trajectory [35]- [36]. The attacker can design IMP-based
attacks by exploiting the knowledge of consensus dynamics
S in (29), instead of agents’ dynamics and all the analysis
results presented in Section IV are valid for the heterogeneous
MASs. In this case, to launch an IMP-based attack, the attacker
should satisfy EΨ ⊆ ES where ES = {λ1(S ), . . . , λq(S )} with
λi(S ) ∀i = 1, . . . , q as the set of eigenvalues of the virtual
exosystem drift dynamics matrix S .
Up to now, the presented analysis has been under the as-
sumption that the communication is noise free. We now briefly
discuss what changes if the communication noise is present,
and propose attack detection and mitigation in the presence of
communication noise. In the presence of Gaussian distributed
communication noise, the local neighborhood tracking error
in (4) becomes
η¯i = ηi + ωi, (30)
where ωi ∼ N(0,Σωi ) denotes the aggregate Gaussian noise
affecting the incoming information to agent i and is given as
ωi =
∑
j∈Ni
ai jωi j, (31)
with ωi j the incoming communication noise from agent j to
agent i. In such situations, the DMAS consensus problem
defined in Problem 1 changes to the mean square consensus
problem. In the presence of Gaussian noise, based on (30), the
control protocol in (3)-(4) becomes
ui(t) = cK
N∑
j=1
ai j(x j(t) − xi(t)) + ωi ∀ i ∈ N , (32)
where ωi ∼ N(0,Σωi ) is defined in (31). Based on mean square
consensus, one has
lim
t→∞E[ui(t)]→0 ∀ i ∈ N , (33)
and thus, based on (1), the steady state of agents converge to a
consensus trajectory in mean square sense and its global form
in (14) becomes
x˙mss = (IN ⊗ A) xmss, (34)
where xmss = limt→∞E[x(t)] denotes the global steady state
of agents in mean square sense. Then, following the same
procedure as Lemmas 3-4 and Theorems 1-3, one can show
that an IMP-based attack does not change the statistical
properties of the local neighborhood tracking error, while a
non-IMP based attack does. Moreover, the local neighborhood
tracking error converges to zero in mean for an IMP-based
attack, and it does not converges to zero in mean for a non-
IMP based attack.
In the next section, attack detection and mitigation mech-
anisms are proposed for both IMP-based and non-IMP based
attacks. To this end, it is assumed that the communication
network is noisy.
V. An Attack Detection Mechanism
In this section, Kullback-Liebler (KL)-based attack detec-
tion and mitigation approaches are developed for both IMP-
based and non-IMP-based attacks.
The KL divergence is a non-negative measure of the relative
entropy between two probability distributions [37], [38] which
is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (KL divergence) [37], [38]. Let X and Z be two
random sequences with probability density functions PX and
PZ , respectively. The KL divergence measure between PX and
PZ is defined as
DKL(X||Z) =
∫
PX(θ) log
(
PX(θ)
PZ(θ)
)
dθ (35)
with the following properties [37]:
1) DKL(PX ||Pz) > 0
2) DKL(PX ||Pz) = 0 if and only if, PX = Pz
3) DKL(PX ||Pz) , DKL(Pz||PX)
In the following subsections, KL-divergence is used to
detect IMP-based and non-IMP-based attacks on DMASs.
7A. Attack detection for IMP-based attacks
In this subsection, an attack detector is designed to identify
IMP-based attacks. To this end, two error sequences τi and
ϕi are defined based on only local exchanged information for
agent i as
τi =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈Ni
ai jdi j
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ (36)
and
ϕi =
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥ai jdi j∥∥∥ (37)
where the measured discrepancy di j between agent i′s state
and its neighbor j′s state under attack becomes
di j = xcj − xci + ωi j ∀ j ∈ Ni (38)
where ωi j ∼ N(0,Σωi j ) denotes the Gaussian incoming com-
munication noise from agent j to agent i. Moreover, xci is the
measured state of agent i under attack and xcj is the possibly
corrupted information it receives from its jth neighbor. If agent
i is not compromised, then xci = xi, and, similarly, if agent j
is not compromised, then xcj = x j. In fact, (36) is the norm
of the summation of the measured discrepancy of agent i and
all its neighbors, and (37) is the summation of norms of those
measured discrepancies. In the absence of attack, these two
signals show the same behavior in the sense that their means
converge to zero.
In the presence of an IMP-based attack and in the absence
of noise, based on Theorem 3, τi goes to zero for intact
agents, despite attack. However, it is obvious that ϕi does
not converge to zero in the presence of an attack. In the
presence of noise, the statistical properties of τi converge to
the statistical properties of the noise. In contrast, the statistical
properties of ϕi depend upon not only the statistical properties
of the noise signal, but also of the attack signal. Therefore,
the behavior of these two signals significantly diverges in the
presence of attacks and can be captured by KL-divergence
methods. Note that one can measure τi and ϕi based on the
exchanged information among agents, which might be cor-
rupted by the attack signal. Existing KL-divergence methods
are, nevertheless, developed for Gaussian signals. However,
while the communication noise is assumed to be Gaussian,
error sequences (36) and (37) are norms of some variable
with Gaussian distributions, thus, they have univariate folded
Gaussian distributions given by [39] ϕi ∼ FN(µ1i, σ21i) and
τi ∼ FN(µ2i, σ22i) . That is,
Pϕi (qi, µ1i, σ1i) =
1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi−µ1i )2
2σ21i +
1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi+µ1i )2
2σ21i
Pτi (qi, µ2i, σ2i) =
1√
2pi |σ2i|
e
− (qi−µ2i )2
2σ22i +
1√
2pi |σ2i|
e
− (qi+µ2i )2
2σ22i
(39)
where µ1i and σ1i are the mean and variance of the error
sequences ϕi and µ2i and σ2i are the mean and variance of the
error sequences τi. Using (35), the KL divergence in terms of
the local error sequences ϕi and τi can be defined as
DKL(ϕi||τi) =
∫
Pϕi (qi) log
(
Pϕi (qi)
Pτi (qi)
)
dqi = E1
(
log
Pϕi (qi)
Pτi (qi)
)
(40)
where E1[.] represents the expectation value with respect to
the distribution of the first sequence [39].
A KL divergence formula for the folded Gaussian distribu-
tions is now developed in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Consider the error sequences τi and ϕi in (36)-
(37) with folded Gaussian distributions Pϕi and Pτi in (39).
Then, the KL divergence between error sequences τi and ϕi,
i.e., DKL(ϕi||τi), becomes
DKL(ϕi||τi) ≈ 12
(
log
σ22i
σ21i
− 1 + (σ−22i σ21i)
)
+
1
2
σ−22i (µ2i − µ1i)2 + 1
1
2
e
4µ21i
σ21i
1 − e
8µ21i
σ21i
 + e−
µ21i
2σ21i
12
e
ρ23
2σ21i + e
ρ24
2σ21i
 −
e
ρ21
2σ21i + e
ρ22
2σ21i


(41)
for some ρ1 = (µ1i − 2µ2iσ21iσ−22i ), ρ2 = (µ1i + 2µ2iσ21iσ−22i ),
ρ3 = (µ1i − 4µ2iσ21iσ−22i ) and ρ4 = (µ1i + 4µ2iσ21iσ−22i ).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
In the following theorem, we show that the effect of IMP-
based attacks can be captured using the KL divergence defined
in (41).
Theorem 4. Consider the DMAS (1) along with the controller
(13), and under the IMP-based attacks. Assume that the
communication noise sequences are i.i.d. Then, for a reachable
intact agent i,
1
T
∫ k+T−1
k
DKL(ϕi||τi)dk > γi (42)
where ϕi and τi are defined in (36) and (37), respectively,
and T and γi represent the window size and the predesigned
threshold parameter.
Proof. According to Theorem 3, the local neighborhood track-
ing error goes to zero for intact agents in the presence
of an IMP-based attack when there is no communication
noise. In the presence of communication noise with Gaussian
distribution, i.e., ωi j ∼ (0,Σωi j ) and IMP-based attack, the
expectation value of the local neighborhood tracking error for
intact agent i becomes
E[ηi] = E[
∑
j∈Ni
ai jdi j]→ 0 (43)
where the measured discrepancy di j is defined in (38). Using
(43), one can write (36) as
τi =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j∈Ni
ai jdi j
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ∼ FN(0, υ¯2ωi) (44)
which represents a folded Gaussian distribution with mean
zero and variance υ¯2ωi. Note that the mean and variance of
the distribution Pτi in (39) become µ2i = 0 and σ
2
2i = υ¯
2
ωi.
8Since noise signals are independent and identically dis-
tributed, from (37), one can infer that the folded Gaussian
distribution Pϕi in (39) has the following statistical properties
ϕi ∼ FN(µ f di , υ¯2ωi + υˆ2ωi + υ¯2f di ) (45)
where µ f di and υ¯
2
ωi
+ υˆ2ωi + υ¯
2
f di
represent the overall mean and
covariance due to the communication noise and overall devi-
ation from the desired behavior in intact neighbors reachable
from the compromised agent.
In the absence of attack, the statistical properties corre-
sponding to sequences τi and ϕi become FN(0, υ¯2ωi) andFN(0, υ¯2ωi + υˆ2ωi ) , respectively, and the corresponding KL
divergence in (41) becomes
DwaKL(ϕi||τi) ≈
1
2
log υ¯2ωi
υ¯2ωi + υˆ
2
ωi
+ υ¯−2ωi υˆ
2
ωi
))
 (46)
where υˆ2ωi represents additional variance in sequence ϕi, which
depends on the communication noise.
Note that τi in (36) is the norm of the summation of
the measured discrepancy of agent i and all its neighbors
whereas ϕi in (37) is the summation of norms of those
measured discrepancies. Even in the absence of attack, they
represent folded Gaussian distributions with zero means and
different covariances due to application of norm on measured
discrepancies.
Now, in the presence of IMP-based attacks, using the de-
rived form of KL divergence for folded Gaussian distributions
from Lemma 5, one can simplify (41) using (44)-(45) as
DKL(ϕi||τi) ≈ 12
log υ¯2ωiυ¯2ωi + υˆ2ωi + υ¯2f di + υ¯
−2
ωi
(υ¯2f di
+ υˆ2ωi )

+
1
2
υ¯−2ωi (µ f di )
2 +
1
2
e
4(µ
f di
)2
υ¯2ωi
+υˆ2ωi
+υ¯2
f di
1 − e
8(µ
f di
)2
υ¯2ωi
+υˆ2ωi
+υ¯2
f di

(47)
Then, one can design the threshold parameter γi such that
1
T
∫ k+T−1
k
DKL(ϕi||τi)dk > γi (48)
where T denotes the sliding window size. This completes the
proof. 
Based on Theorem 4, one can use the following conditions
for attack detection.
1
T
∫ k+T−1
k
DKL(ϕi||τi)dk < γi : H0
1
T
∫ k+T−1
k
DKL(ϕi||τi)dk > γi : H1
(49)
where γi denotes the designed threshold for detection, the null
hypotheses H0 represents the intact mode and H1 denotes the
compromised mode of an agent.
B. Attack detection for non-IMP-based attacks
This subsection presents the design of a KL-based attack
detector for non-IMP based attacks.
It was shown in Theorem 3 that the local neighborhood
tracking error goes to zero if agents are under IMP-based
attacks. Therefore, for the case of non-IMP-based attacks,
one can identify these types of attacks using the changes in
the statistical properties of the local neighborhood tracking
error. In the absence of attack, since the Gaussian noise, i.e.,
ωi ∼ N(0,Σωi ), is considered in the communication link, the
local neighborhood tracking error ηi in (30) has the following
statistical properties
ηi ∼ N(0,Σωi ) (50)
and it represents the nominal behavior of the system.
In the presence of attacks, using (30), the local neighbor-
hood tracking error ηai can be written as
ηai =
∑
j∈Ni
ai jdi j (51)
where measured discrepancy under attacks di j is defined (38).
From (51), one has
ηai ∼ N(µ fi ,Σ fi + Σωi ) (52)
where µ fi and Σ fi are, respectively, mean and covariance of
the overall deviation due to corrupted states under attacks as
given in (38).
Now, since both ηai and ηi have normal Gaussian distri-
butions, the KL divergence in the terms of ηai and ηi as
DKL(ηai ||ηi) can be written as [40]
DKL(ηai ||ηi) =
1
2
log
∣∣∣Σηi ∣∣∣∣∣∣Σηai ∣∣∣ − n + tr(Σ−1ηi Σηai )

+
1
2
(µηi − µηai )T Σ−1ηi (µηi − µηai )
(53)
where µηi and Σηi denote the mean and covariance of ηi and
µηai and Σηai denote the mean and covariance of η
a
i . Moreover,
n denotes the dimension of the error sequence. Define the
average of KL divergence over a window T as
D¯i =
1
T
∫ k+T−1
k
DKL(ηai ||ηi)dk (54)
The following theorem says that the effect of non-IMP based
attacks can be detected using the KL divergence between the
two error sequences ηai and ηi.
Theorem 5. Consider the DMAS (1) along with the controller
(13). Then,
1) in the absence of attack, D¯i defined in (54) tends to zero.
2) in the presence of a non-IMP-based attack, D¯i defined
in (54) is greater than a predefined threshold γi.
Proof. In the absence of attacks, the statistical properties of
sequences ηi and ηai are the same as in (50). Therefore, the KL
divergence DKL(ηai ||ηi) in (53) becomes zero and this makes
D¯i in (54) zero. This completes the proof of part 1.
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(Σ−1ωi (Σ fi +Σωi )−n = tr(Σ−1ωi Σ fi ), one can write the KL divergence
between ηai and ηi as
DKL(ηai ||ηi) =
1
2
(log
∣∣∣Σωi ∣∣∣∣∣∣Σ fi + Σωi ∣∣∣ + tr(Σ−1ωi Σ fi ) + µTfiΣ−1ωi µ fi ) (55)
Then, using (54), one has
D¯i =
1
T
k+T−1∫
k
1
2
log
∣∣∣Σωi ∣∣∣∣∣∣Σ fi + Σωi ∣∣∣ + tr(Σ−1ωi Σ fi ) + µTfiΣ−1ωi µ fi ) > γi
(56)
where T and γi denote the sliding window size and the
predefined design threshold, respectively. This completes the
proof. 
Based on Theorem 5, one can use the following conditions
for attack detection:  D¯i < γi : H0D¯i > γi : H1 (57)
where γi denotes the designed threshold for detection, the null
hypotheses H0 represents the intact mode of the system and
H1 denotes the compromised mode of the system.
In the next section, Theorems 4 and 5 are employed to
propose an attack mitigation approach which enables us to
mitigate both IMP-based attacks and non-IMP-based attacks.
VI. An Attack Mitigation Mechanism
In this section, both IMP-based and non-IMP-based attacks
are mitigated using the presented detection mechanisms in the
previous section.
A. Self-belief of agents about their outgoing information
To determine the level of trustworthiness of each agent
about its own information, a self-belief value is presented.
If an agent detects an attack, it reduces its level of trustwor-
thiness about its own understanding of the environment and
communicates it with its neighbors to inform them about the
significance of its outgoing information and thus slow down
the attack propagation.
For the IMP-based attacks, using the DKL(ϕi||τi) from The-
orem 4, we define c1i (t) as
c1i (t) = κ1
t∫
0
eκ1(τ−t)χ1i (τ)dτ (58)
where 0 6 c1i (t) 6 1 with
χ1i (t) =
∆i
∆i + DKL(ϕi||τi) (59)
where ∆i represents the threshold to account for the channel
fading and other uncertainties and κ1 > 0 denotes the discount
factor. Equation (58) can be implemented by the following
differential equation
c˙1i (t) + κ1c
1
i (t) = κ1χ
1
i (t)
According to Theorem 4, in the presence of IMP-based
attacks, DKL(ϕi||τi) increases, which makes χ1i (t) approach zero
and consequently makes the value of c1i (t) close to zero. On the
other hand, without an attack, DKL(ϕi||τi) tends to zero, making
χ1i (t) approach 1 and, consequently, c
1
i (t) becomes close to 1.
The larger the value of c1i (t) is, the more confident the agent
is about the trustworthiness of its broadcasted information.
Similarly, for the non-IMP-based attacks, using the
DKL(ηai ||ηi) from Theorem 5, we define c2i (t) as
c2i (t) = κ2
t∫
0
eκ2(τ−t)χ2i (τ)dτ (60)
where 0 6 c2i (t) 6 1 with
χ2i (t) =
∆i
∆i + DKL(ηai ||ηi)
(61)
where ∆i represents the threshold to account for the channel
fading and other uncertainties, and κ2 > 0 denotes the discount
factor. Expression (60) can be generated by
c˙2i (t) + κ2c
2
i (t) = κ2χ
2
i (t)
Using Theorem 6 and the same argument as we employed
for c1i (t), one can show that c
2
i (t) is close to 1 in the absence
of an attack, and close to zero in the presence of a non-IMP
based attack.
Then, using c1i (t) and c
2
i (t) defined in (58) and (60), the self-
belief of an agent i for both IMP and non-IMP-based attacks
is defined as
ξi(t) = min{c1i (t), c2i (t)} (62)
If an agent i is under direct attack or receives corrupted
information from its neighbors, then the self-belief of the
agent i tends to zero. In such a situation, it transmits the
low self-belief value to its neighbor to put less weight on
the information they receive from it and this prevents attack
propagation in the distributed network.
B. Trust of agents about their incoming information
The trust value represents the level of confidence of an
agent on its neighbors’ information. If the self-belief value
of an agent is low, it forms beliefs on its neighbors (either
intact or compromised) and updates its trust value which
depends on the beliefs on each of its neighbors using only
local information. Therefore, agents identify the compromised
neighbor and discard its information.
Using the KL divergence between exchanged information
of agent i and its neighbor, one can define ηi j(t) as
ηi j(t) = κ3
t∫
0
eκ3(τ−t)Li j(τ)dτ (63)
where 0 6 ηi j(t) 6 1 with
Li j(t) = 1 − Λ1
Λ1 + e
( −Λ2
DKL (x j ||mi )
) ∀ j ∈ Ni (64)
with mi =
∑
j∈Ni
x j and Λ1,Λ2 > 0 represent the threshold to
account for channel fading and other uncertainties, and κ3 > 0
denotes the discount factor. For the compromised neighbor, the
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KL divergence DKL(x j||mi) tends to zero, which makes Li j(t)
close to zero. Consequently, this makes the value of ηi j(t)
close to zero. On the other hand, if the incoming neighbor
is not compromised, then DKL(x j||mi) increases and makes
ηi j(t) approach 1. Equation (63) can be implemented using
the following differential equation
η˙i j(t) + κ3ηi j(t) = κ3Li j(t)
Now, we define the trust value of an agent on its neighbors
as
Ωi j(t) = max(ξi(t), ηi j(t)) (65)
with 0 6 Ωi j(t) 6 1.
In the absence of attacks, the state of agents converge to the
consensus trajectory and the KL divergence DKL(x j||mi), ∀ j ∈
Ni tends to zero which results in Ωi j(t) being 1 ∀ j ∈ Ni. In the
presence of attacks, ηi j(t) corresponding to the compromised
agents tends to zero.
C. The mitigation mechanism using trust and self-belief values
In this subsection, the trust and self-belief values are utilized
to design the mitigation algorithm. To achieve resiliency, both
self-belief and trust values are incorporated into the exchange
information among agents. Consequently, the resilient form of
local neighborhood tracking error (30) is presented as
η˜i =
∑
j∈Ni
Ωi j(t)ξ j(t)ai j
(
x j − xi
)
+ ωi (66)
where Ωi j(t) and ξ j(t) denote, respectively, the trust value and
the self-belief of neighboring agents. Using (3) and (66), the
resilient control protocol becomes
u˜i = cKη˜i, ∀ i ∈ N (67)
According to (66), the topology of the graph changes over
time due to incorporation of the trust and the self-belief values
of agents, thus we denote the time-varying graph as G(t) =
(V, E(t)) with E(t) ⊆ V × V representing the set of time-
varying edges.
Now, based on following definitions and lemma, we for-
mally present Theorem 6 to illustrate that the trust and self-
belief based proposed resilient control protocol (67) solves
Problem 1 and all intact agents, i.e., NInt = N\NComp as
defined in Definition 4 achieve the final desired consensus
value for DMAS in (1), despite attacks.
Definition 6 (r-reachable set) [41]. Given a directed graph
G and a nonempty subset Vs ⊂ V, the set Vs is r-reachable
if there exists a node i ∈ Vs such that |Ni\Vs| > r, where
r ∈ Z>0. 
Definition 7 (r-robust graph) [41]. A directed graph G is
called an r-robust graph with r ∈ Z>0 if for every pair of
nonempty, disjoint subsets of V, at least one of the subsets is
r-reachable. 
Assumption 3. If at most q neighbors of each intact agents is
under attack, at least (q + 1) neighbors of each intact agents
are intact.
Lemma 6. [41] Consider an r-robust time-varying directed
graph G(t). Then, the graph has a directed spanning tree, if
and only if G(t) is 1-robust.
Theorem 6. Consider the DMAS (1) under attack with
the proposed resilient control protocol u˜i in (67). Let the
time-varying graph G(t) be such that at each time in-
stant t, Assumption 1 and Assumption 3 are satisfied. Then,
lim
t→∞ ||x j(t) − xi(t)|| = 0 ∀i, j ∈ NInt.
Proof. The DMAS (1) with the proposed resilient control
protocol u˜i in (67) without noise can be written as
x˙i = Axi + cBK
∑
j∈Ni
ai j(t)
(
x j − xi
)
(68)
where ai j(t) = Ψi j(t)C j(t)ai j. The global form of resilient
system dynamics in (68) becomes
x˙ = (IN ⊗ A − cL(t) ⊗ BK)x (69)
where L(t) denotes the time-varying graph Laplacian matrix
of the directed graph G(t). Based on Assumption 3, even
if q neighbors of an intact agent are attacked and collude
to send the corrupted value to misguide it, there still exists
q + 1 intact neighbors that communicate values different from
the compromised ones. Moreover, since at least q + 1 of
the intact agent’s neighbors are intact, it can update its trust
values to remove the compromised neighbors. Furthermore,
since the time varying graph G(t) resulting from isolating the
compromised agents is 1-robust, based on Definition 7 and
Lemma 6, the entire network is still connected to the intact
agents. Therefore, there exists a spanning tree in the graph
associated with all intact agents NInt. Hence, it is shown in
[42] that the solutions of DMAS in (69) reach consensus
on desired behavior if the time-varying graph G(t) jointly
contains a spanning tree as the network evolves with time. This
results in lim
t→∞ ||x j(t) − xi(t)|| = 0 ∀i, j ∈ NInt assymptotically.
This completes the proof. 
Remark 7. The proposed approach discards the compromised
agent only when an attack is detected, in contrast to most of
the existing methods that are based on solely the discrepancy
among agents. Note that discrepancy can be the result of a
legitimate change in the state of one agent. Moreover, in the
beginning of synchronization, there could be a huge discrep-
ancy between agents’ states that should not be discarded.
VII. Simulation Results
In this section, an example is provided to illustrate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed detection and mitigation approaches.
Consider a group of 5 homogeneous agents with the dynamics
defined as
x˙k = Axk + Buk k = 1, . . . , 5 (70)
where
A =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
, B =
[
1
0
]
.
The communication graph is shown in Fig. 1. In the absence
of an attack, agents reach desired synchronization and there
emerges the healthy behavior of the system with noisy com-
munication as shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1: Communication topology.
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Fig. 2: Desired synchronization in the absence of attack. (a) The state of agents. (b) The
local neighborhood tracking error of agents.
A. IMP-based attacks
This subsection analyzes the effects of IMP-based attacks
and illustrates our attack detection and mitigation scheme. The
attack signal is assumed to be f = 20 sin(t). This is an IMP-
based attack and is assumed to be launched on Agent 1 (root
node) at time t=20. The results are shown in Fig. 3. It can
be seen that the compromised agent destabilizes the entire
network. This result is consistent with Theorem 2. It is shown
in Fig. 4 that the same IMP-based attack on Agent 5 (noon-root
node) cannot destabilize the entire network. However, Agent
4, which is the only agent reachable from Agent 5, does not
synchronize to the desired consensus trajectory. Moreover, one
can see that the local neighborhood tracking error converges
to zero for all intact agents except the compromised Agent
5. These results are in line with Theorem 3. Fig.5 shows the
divergence in the presence of non-IMP based attack on Agent 5
based on Theorem 4. Then, the effect of attack is rejected using
the presented belief-based detection and mitigation approach
in Theorem 4 and Theorem 6. Fig.6 shows that reachable
agents follow the desired consensus trajectory, even in the
presence of the attack.
B. Non-IMP-based attacks
This subsection analyzes the effects of non-IMP-based at-
tacks and validates our attack detection and mitigation ap-
proach. The attack signal is assumed to be f = 10 + 5 sin(2t).
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
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-500
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1000
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Fig. 3: The state of agents when Agent 1 is under an IMP-based attack.
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Fig. 4: Agent 5 is under IMP-based attack. (a) The state of agents. (b) The local
neighborhood tracking error of agents.
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Fig. 5: Divergence for state of agents when Agent 5 is under a IMP-based attack.
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Fig. 6: The state of agents using the proposed attack detection and mitigation approach
for IMP-based attack.
The effect of this non-IMP-based attack on Agent 5 (non-root
node) is shown in Fig.7. It can be seen that this non-IMP-based
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attack on Agent 5 only affects the reachable Agent 4. Then,
Fig.8 shows the divergence in the presence of non-IMP based
attack on Agent 5 based on Theorem 5. It is shown in Fig.9 that
the effect of the attack is removed for the intact Agent 4 using
belief-based detection and mitigation approaches presented in
Theorems 5 and 6.
0 10 20 30 40 50
Time (s)
-5
0
5
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Fig. 7: The state of agents when Agent 5 is under a non-IMP-based attack.
0 10 20 30 40 50
Time (s)
0
10
20
30
40
50
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Fig. 8: Divergence for state of agents when Agent 5 is under a non-IMP based attack.
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Fig. 9: The state of agents after attack detection and mitigation for non-IMP based attack.
VIII. Conclusion
A resilient control framework has been introduced for
DMASs. First, the effects of IMP-based and non-IMP-based
attacks on DMASs have been analyzed using a graph-theoretic
approach. Then, a KL divergence based criterion, using only
the observed local information of agents, has been employed to
detect attacks. Each agent detects its neighbors’ misbehaviors,
consequently forming a self-belief about the correctness of its
own information, and continuously updates its self-belief and
communicates it with its neighbors to inform them about the
significance of its outgoing information. Additionally, if the
self-belief value of an agent is low, it forms beliefs on the type
of its neighbors (intact or compromised) and, consequently,
updates its trust of its neighbors. Finally, agents incorporate
their neighbors’ self-beliefs and their own trust values in their
control protocols to slow down and mitigate attacks.
A possible direction for future work is to extend these
results to synchronization of DMASs with nonlinear dynam-
ics. Since nonlinear systems can exhibit finite-time escape
behavior, a problem of interest is to find the conditions
under which the attacker can make the trajectories of agents
become unbounded in finite time, and to obtain detection and
mitigation mechanisms to counteract such attacks fast and thus
avoid instability.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 5
Using (41), the KL divergence between error sequences ϕi
and τi can be written as
DKL(ϕi||τi) = E1[log Pϕi − log Pτi ] (71)
where probability density functions Pϕi and Pτi are defined in
(39). Using (39), (71) becomes
DKL(ϕi||τi)
= E1[log
 1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi−µ1i )2
2σ21i +
1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi+µ1i )2
2σ21i

− log
 1√
2pi |σ2i|
e
− (qi−µ2i )2
2σ22i +
1√
2pi |σ2i|
e
− (qi+µ2i)2
2σ22i
]
(72)
By the aid of the logarithm property as log(a+b) = log(a)+
log(1 + b/a), (72) turns into
DKL(ϕi||τi) =
= E1[log
 1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi−µ1i )2
2σ21i
 − log  1√
2pi |σ2i|
e
− (qi−µ2i )2
2σ22i
]︸                                                                   ︷︷                                                                   ︸
T1
+E1[log
(
1 + e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i
)
− log
(
1 + e
− 2qiµ2i
σ22i
)
]︸                                             ︷︷                                             ︸
T2
(73)
The first term in (73) is a KL divergence formula for
statistical sequences with normal Gaussian distribution which
is given in [40] as
T1 =
1
2
log σ22i
σ21i
− 1 + (σ−22i σ21i)
 + 12σ−22i (µ2i − µ1i)2 (74)
The second term T2 in (73), using power series expansion
log(1 + a) =
∑
n>0
(
(−1)nan+1
/
(n + 1)
)
and ignoring higher order
terms, can be approximated as
T2 ≈ E1[e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i − (e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i )
2
2
] − E1[e
− 2qiµ2i
σ22i − (e
− 2qiµ2i
σ22i )
2
2
] (75)
which can be expressed as
T2 ≈
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i dqi − 12
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 4qiµ1i
σ21i dqi
−
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ2i
σ22i dqi +
1
2
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 4qiµ2i
σ22i dqi
(76)
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Now, the first term of T2 can be written as
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i dqi
=
∞∫
−∞
1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi+µ1i )2
2σ21i dqi +
∞∫
−∞
1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi+µ1i)2+4qiµ1i
2σ21i dqi
(77)
Using the fact that density integrates to 1, (77) becomes
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i dqi = 1 + e
4µ21i
σ21i (78)
Similarly, second term of T2 can be written as
−1
2
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 4qiµ1i
σ21i dqi
= − 1
2
√
2pi |σ1i|
∞∫
−∞
e− (qi+3µ1i )2−8µ21i2σ21i dqi + e− (qi+5µ1i )2−24µ21i2σ21i dqi

(79)
which yields
− 1
2
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 4qiµ1i
σ21i dqi = −12
e 4µ21iσ21i + e 12µ21iσ21i
 (80)
The third term of T2 is
−
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i dqi
= − 1√
2pi |σ1i|
∞∫
−∞
e− (qi−µ1i )22σ21i e− 2qiµ2iσ22i + e− (qi+µ1i )22σ21i e− 2qiµ2iσ22i dqi
(81)
which can be written in the form
−
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i dqi
= −
e−
µ21i−ρ21
2σ21i
∞∫
−∞
1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi−ρ1)2
2σ21i dqi
+e
− µ
2
1i−ρ22
2σ21i
∞∫
−∞
1√
2pi |σ1i|
e
− (qi−ρ2)2
2σ21i dqi

(82)
where ρ1 = (µ1i − 2µ2iσ21iσ−22i ) and ρ2 = (µ1i + 2µ2iσ21iσ−22i )
which becomes
−
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i dqi = −
e− µ21i−ρ212σ21i + e− µ21i−ρ222σ21i
 (83)
Similarly, the last term of T2 can be simplified as
1
2
∞∫
−∞
Pϕi e
− 2qiµ1i
σ21i dqi =
1
2
e− µ21i−ρ232σ21i + e− µ21i−ρ242σ21i
 (84)
where ρ3 = (µ1i − 4µ2iσ21iσ−22i ) and ρ4 = (µ1i + 4µ2iσ21iσ−22i ) .
Adding (78), (80), (83) and (84), T2 can be written as
T2 ≈ e
− µ
2
1i
2σ21i
12
e ρ232σ21i + e ρ242σ21i
 −
e ρ212σ21i + e ρ222σ21i


+1 +
1
2
e
4µ21i
σ21i
1 − e 8µ21iσ21i

(85)
Now, using (74)-(75) and (85), one gets (41). This completes
the proof.
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